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T he Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (PRWORA), popularly known as "Welfare Reform,"
contains three overarching goals: reducing the federal deficit by cut-
ting domestic spending, assisting the country's needy children, and
discouraging behaviors which ostensibly lead to welfare "dependen-
cy."1 Although the bill President Clinton signed did not contain some
of the more outrageous features found in earlier Republican proposals,
such as placing impoverished children in orphanages, this act does
completely restructure the federal system of public assistance.2 States
must implement these changes to the welfare system by July 1, 1997.
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The President and 104th
Congress failed in their attempt to
design effective reforms in PRWO-
RA. The rhetoric of good intention
obscures punitive funding cut-offs
directed at families who do not con-
form to the model of a married two
parent native born family. While
some people hail PRWORA as a
means of reducing public spending,
the act is really a misdirected and
vindictive attack on single mothers,
teenagers and non-citizens.
The new welfare policies do not
help the impoverished children they
purport to serve. The funding caps
enacted through PRWORA provide
only illusory, short term benefits;
they do not create real reform.
Proponents of funding caps mistak-
enly assume that the interests of chil-
dren can be divorced from the needs
of their families. Children, however,
need quality child care, health care,
housing and nutrition regardless of
why their parents can not provide
them.
Section I of this article provides a
brief overview of some of the provi-
sions of PRWORA. Section II focus-
es on the three stated goals of the act:
reducing the deficit, helping the
nation's needy children and changing
the behavior of welfare recipients. It
also examines why the act fails to
meet these goals. Section III
adresses ways in which punitive
funding cuts serve to undermine fam-
ilies without improving the lives of
impoverished children. Section IV
focuses on three such funding cut-
offs: first, the teen parent provisions
that deny funding to teens not living
with legal guardians; second, the
family cap/child exclusion policies
that deny funding to children born to
women on welfare; and third, the five
year time limit on eligibility. Section
V examines the discourse surround-
ing welfare reform and points to the
ways in which PRWORA is influ-
enced by mysogynistic gender ideol-
ogy. Finally, Section VI proposes
that policy makers must redefine
their approach to welfare reform and
search for realistic solutions in the
future.
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
The PRWORA ends "entitlement
status ' 3 for most types of federal
government aid to poor Americans.
The federal government no longer
guarantees that it will provide
enough support to poor residents of
the United States to meet their basic
needs. In addition, the federal gov-
ernment will no longer administer
general public assistance funds. The
federal government will instead allo-
cate "welfare" funds in the form of
"block grants" to individual states.
4
States may use the money at their
discretion, within federal guidelines.
States will establish their own pro-
grams, set their own eligibility crite-
rion and funding levels for families,
and can extend cut-off dates or cut
recipients off at will.
The PRWORA replaces the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program with Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF). Unlike AFDC, TANF
imposes a five year cumulative time
limit for cash assistance. TANF has a
two year limit for meeting work
requirements. Under this program,
states may reduce benefits to recipi-
ents who fail to disclose the paternity
of their dependent children. TANF
also imposes mandatory live-at-home
and school attendance policies on
parenting teens. TANF allows states
to deny funding to both felony drug
offenders and many legal immi-
grants.
Under TANF, states have enor-
mous discretion within very broad
federal guidelines. States can estab-
lish eligibility criteria that do not
necessarily incorporate economic sta-
tus or financial need For example, a
state could impose mandatory drug
testing for benefit recipients. 5 States
may deny TANF funding to unmar-
ried minor parents, legal immigrants,
and children bom to aid recipients.
The federal policy permits states to
impose time limits of less than five
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years on any or all TANF recipients.
Alternatively, states will be able to
exempt up to twenty percent of their
caseloads from the five year time
limit. States will be allowed to con-
tinue experimental programs already
in place.
II. THREE GOALS
A. REDUCTION OF THE FED-
ERAL DEFICIT
Bipartisan leaders tout these
"reform" measures as a significant
battle won in the war to balance the
budget. Federal funding for the
TANF block grants will amount to
$16.4 billion dollars annually from
fiscal yearsl996 to 2001.
Congressional Quarterly Weekly
reports that the total estimated sav-
ings to the federal government will
be $54.1 billion dollars over six
years. 6 These savings, however, will
only have a small impact on the total
federal budget. Even the AFDC pro-
gram, before recent cuts made up
only 1% of the entire federal budget.7
Funding is allocated proportion-
ately according to the state's highest
rate of expenditure for AFDC for the
last several years. As a result, some
states could experience short-term
surpluses if their TANF recipient lists
are smaller now than their old AFDC
rolls. 8 Similarly, states might find
themselves with extra money if their
unemployment rate remains lower
than it was in the early 1990s.
However, these gains by the states
may be short lived when unemploy-
ment rises. Additionally, if there
were an economic downturn, states,
counties and municipalities would
have to find funds, beyond the feder-
al block grant allocation, to feed and
house poor families. As a result, the
figure of a federal savings of $54.1
billion does not really reflect an
accurate amount of money saved by
the PRWORA.
When President Clinton signed
the PRWORA, he expressed concern
that it failed to provide sufficient
contingency funding for states expe-
riencing economic trouble.9 The Act
does adjust for growth in population
and economic hardships. Howevr,
states are only eligible for additional
funding if they have met one hundred
percent of their federally mandated
goals for employment, reduction in
out of wedlock births and lowered
benefits to recipients. 10 If a state is
unable to meet those targets for any
reason, it may become ineligible for
additional funding. States will then
have to make up the difference from
state tax funds. To avoid this, states
might adjust the statistics to make
themselves eligible for additional
funding by cutting off families who
have been unable to work.
It is impossible to predict the eco-
nomic and unemployment rates for
each state over the next five years.
Furthermore, it is difficult to estimate
what the drain will be on county gov-
ernments that are already financially
strapped if a recession forces them to
increase general assistance funding
for hungry families. 11 These uncer-
tainties make claims of a huge reduc-
tion of public expenditure seem pre-
mature.
B. HELPING CHILDREN
Another goal of welfare
reform is to help impoverished chil-
dren. In a recently published article,
Speaker of the House of
Representatives Newt Gingrich urged




an average of $1,300 a
year from the incomes
of the poorest one-fifth
of families
with children.
this failed system. Our goal should
be to wake up one morning with the
certainty that not one single child
died during the night in a public
housing project." 12 This rhetoric of
assisting children is bipartisan.
President Clinton echoed the same
sentiment when he signed the bill,
remarking that it, "promotes family
and protects children." 
1 3
In opposition to Clinton and
Gingrich, child advocacy organiza-
tions describe the passage of the
PRWORA as a crushing defeat. The
Children's Defense Fund (CDF) is
the nation's largest child advocacy
organization. CDF estimates that
cuts and structural changes from vari-
ous provisions of the PRWORA will
affect at least eight million families
by removing an average of $1,300 a
year from the incomes of the poorest
one-fifth of families with children.
CDF estimates that the changes
found in PRWORA will push an
additional one million children into
poverty.
14
Other agencies have also noted
the harsh consequences of PRWO-
RA. The office of Management and
Budget estimates that child care
funding could fall up to $2.4 billion
short of the amount needed to ensure
that parents will be able to leave their
children in a safe child care setting. 15
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The Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) estimates that 300,000 chil-
dren with disabilities such as autism,
tuberculosis, mental retardation, and
head injuries will lose Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) cash funding.
According to CBO 40,000 to 50,000
of these children will also lose
Medicaid benefits.
16
The PRWORA fails to provide
direct assistance to children. Instead,
the funding caps attempt to help chil-
dren by restricting the behaviors of
the adults who support them. The
PRWORA enacts sanctions against
parents for their life choices instead
of providing concrete assistance to
ensure that food is put on the table.
Rather than address the structural
constraints that limit a family's abili-
ty to support themselves, PRWRO-
RA aims to change individual behav-
iors.
C. CHANGING THE BEHAVIOR
OF WELFARE RECIPIENTS
1. INTRUSION INTO THE LIVES
OF THE UNENTITLED
AFDC and TANF are fundamen-
tally different from other assistance
programs. Often, voters mistakenly
perceive that the government allo-
cates funds under programs like
unemployment insurance and Social
Security based on the recipient's past
contribution to these programs.
Therefore, in the public's view, the
recipients deserve those benefits.
However, AFDC/TANF programs
are not based on the recipient's past
contribution. These programs are
based on our national conviction that
society has a moral duty to help out
its least fortunate citizens. People
who disagree with this philosophy
often perceive AFDC/TANF pro-
grams as "hand-outs." As Lisa
Maher points out, "these 'hand-outs'
are subject to far more intrusive con-
trols and surveillance [than other
government programs]."' 17 Maher
notes that voters and legislators often
feel that the government should mon-
itor recipients of AFDC/TANF funds
to prevent abuse of the system. Yet
such "monitoring" programs might
likewise be abused. Who will moni-
tor the monitors? For example,
mechanisms to control the lifestyles
of welfare recipients are not general-
ly subject to any of the usual require-
ments of due process'or other proce-
dural safeguards. 18 Further, women
on welfare by definition have few
economic resources. Their poverty
contributes to their inability to seek
legal recourse when they suffer injus-
tice. These disempowering factors
make these women an easy group to
coerce or control.
Government monitoring of the
lifestyle and morality of parents who
receive public assistance is not new.
Such monitoring was common under
the Widows' Pension, 19 ADC20 and
AFDC programs 21 in the late 1960's.
Social workers intruded into female
recipients' homes to make "midnight
bed checks." They would also enter
unannounced to ensure that no man
lived in the house, often checking
closets for any telltale shoes or
clothes. Social workers arbitrarily
denied benefits to women of color or
women they considered immoral.
Male welfare recipients who did not
work were jailed. Most of these
practices were deemed unconstitu-
tional upon judicial review.22
However, the spirit of the programs
from the 1960's clearly lives in the
tone and intent of the PRWORA pro-
visions that sanction teen mothers,
recipients who can not work and
women who bear children out of
wedlock.
2. WAGING WAR ON
OUT-OF-WEDLOCK BIRTHS
The PRWORA attempts to stop a
nationwide rise in childbearing out-
side of state sanctioned marriage.
Since 1980, illegitimacy increased
from a total of eighteen percent of
births to thirty-one percent today.
Margaret Usdansky writes that,
"unwed mothers have become a sym-
bol of growing disregard for tradi-
tional mores." 23 Welfare mothers are
more vulnerable to control mecha-
nisms than more economically secure
unmarried mothers. Legislators can
use welfare cut-offs to create an
incentive for women to marry before
bearing children. The implicit
assumption in this practice is that
lower rates of illegitimacy would pre-
sumably restore social order and
eliminate the need for public assis-
tance. The PRWORA also sends a
message to women of all socioeco-
nomic classes that out of wedlock
childbearing is unacceptable.
The PRWORA declares that
"marriage is the foundation for a suc-
cessful society... (and) an essential
institution...which promotes the inter-
ests of children." 24 The PRWORA
blames out-of-wedlock pregnancies,
unmarried teen pregnancies, and sin-
gle motherhood for a host of social
ills. 25 The social ills include
increased public assistance spending,
low birth weight babies, children's
low cognitive scores, low educational
attainment, grade school failure, and
violent crime.26 The findings con-
clude, "in light of this demonstration
of the crisis in our Nation, it is the
sense of Congress the prevention of
out of wedlock pregnancy and reduc-
tion of out-of-wedlock birth are very
important Government interests..." 27
Promoting marriage does not
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solve the problem of welfare depen-






solution for welfare dependency is
unreasonable and overly simplistic.
Focusing on marriage ignores the
real life conditions and needs of the
women who depend on government
aid. In fact, social reasearch indi-
cates that there is little likelihood that
marriage would alleviate the need for
single mothers to receive government
aid. Demographers Christopher
Jencks and Kathryn Edin report, "for
marriage to make a mother better off
than she would be on welfare, her
husband must usually earn at least
$12, 000 a year. There are not
enough men (or jobs) like that to go
around." They note: "In 1989, just
before the recent recession, there
were 22 million American women
between the ages of 25 and 34.
About 20 million of these women
either had a child or wanted one.
Fewer than 16 million men of the
same age had annual incomes above
$12,000. Some of these men were
gay or reluctant to marry for other
reasons. Others were philanderers,
wife beaters, substance abusers or
child molesters. By traditional
American standards the number of
acceptable husbands was probably no
more than two-thirds the number of
women who wanted children." 28
The narrow focus on marriage
and decreasing out-of-wedlock births
enables lawmakers to ignore the real-
ity of the lives of most poor women.
The authors of the act also imply that
poor women have made a lifestyle
decision to stay on welfare, which
results in their family's poverty.
However, the authors of the PRWO-
RA fail to address the lack of educa-
tional opportunities, long-term job
prospects, and adequate child and
health care that women need to bring
their families out of poverty. Further,
the authors ignore research which
reveals a demographically limited
number of suitable spouses.
Marriage does not provide a cheap
solution to the complex social issues
that create poverty. Attempting to
solve the welfare puzzle by insisting
that women should be married before
bearing children ignores the exis-
tence of many children already born
to unmarried mothers.
Ill. THE PRWORA ASSUMES
COMPETING INTERESTS
PRWORA seems to posit that
mothers' interests and children's
interests are not only diametrically
opposed, but competing. By using
the language of "personal responsi-
bility," Congress and the President
promote a vision of family in which
the interests of individual members
oppose one another. This discourse
creates a false dichotomy with the
interests of children on one side and
the interests of parents on the other.
This rhetoric does not help children
or parents overcome poverty. The
authors of PRWORA incorrectly
assume that society can punish
women for their behavior without
punishing their children as well.
Further, they assert that punishing
mothers will actually help their chil-
dren.
Robert Rector of the Heritage
Foundation reflects this view when
he argues that conservative organiza-
tions are the only real children's
lobby. Rector suggests that child
advocacy organizations like CDF
should be redefined as the "single
mother's lobby."29 Apparently,
Rector assumes that no single organi-
zation can advocate for both children
and contemporary families simulta-
neously.
People like Rector who assume
that the interests of children and par-
ents are incompatible may actually
hurt the well-being of the nation's
impoverished children. PRWORA
emphasizes policies that might dis-
courage poor women from having
children in the future, but it does so
at the expense of today's children.
PRWORA's coercive cut-offs and
inflexible policies do not expand
access to safe and affordable child
and health care, adequate nutrition or
education. While PRWORA claims
to focus on parents, in fact the Act
ultimately penalizes children. The
practical effect of the PRWORA is to
punish these children for allowing
themselves to be born to poor single
mothers.
The PRWORA treats impover-
ished women like wayward children.
The Act relies on negative reinforce-
ment and punishments to compel
compliance. For example, the
PRWORA requires mandatory drug
testing, limits access to benefits
based on employment records, cuts
benefits if a student earns poor
grades, and caps benefits if a woman
has another child after she has
applied for assistance. These pre-
scriptive sanctions assume that par-
ents must be forced to make appro-
priate lifestyle choices because they
are incapable of making these choic-
es on their own. The PRWORA's
punitive approach neglects the real
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needs of parents who are trying to pro-
vide for their families. Given the
choice, most mothers would prefer to
have access to affordable health, child
care, education, and safe living condi-
tions. Focusing on individual behav-
iors and blaming aid recipients for
their economic and social circum-
stances ignores the evidence that
researchers have uncovered regarding
the structural nature of poverty. In
fact, author Barbara Katz Rothman
argues that society prefers to believe
that impoverished mothers elect to
engage in behavior that makes them
poor, because by allocating the blame
to individuals, we avoid collective
responsibility. 30 According to
Rothman, we want to believe that a
woman "chooses" her situation, so that
we can force her to take responsibility
for that choice. Thus we do not owe
her anything. By focusing on individ-
ual failure, society blatantly refuses to
recognize the larger social issues that
create poverty.
IV. THREE SAMPLE PRWORA
PROVISIONS:
In order to more clearly examine
the effects of the PRWORA on aid
recipients, this section discusses three
provisions of the act that attempt to
answer the problem of poverty by
altering the behavior of women. First,
this section discusses the "teen par-
ent" provisions. Second, it evaluates
the "child exclusion/ family cap"
option. Finally, this section analyzes
the PRWORA's five-year cumulative
time limit for funding.
A. ATTACKS ON TEEN PARENTS
The PRWORA and other recent
legislation, such as the Teen
Pregnancy Reduction Act of 1996,31
focus on limiting unmarried teen preg-
nancy in order to cut down on public
expenditures and restore 'tradition-
al' mores. These policies are based
on a misunderstanding of the issues
facing mothering teens. In essence,
they attack teen mothers without
taking any real action to help low
income children or cut down public
expenditure.
Before Congress enacted the
PRWORA, the Family Support Act
of 1988 allowed states to enact "live
at home" rules.32 Such rules require
parents under age eighteen to live
with their parents or legal guardians
in order to qualify for public assis-
tance. Twenty-one states have
already implemented this policy,
thirteen in the last year alone.33 The
PRWORA now mandates the live-at-
home rule nationwide.
The live-at-home rule highlights
the assumptions and problems inher-
ent in the PRWORA's misinformed
attempt at welfare policy reform.
For example, despite popular con-
ception, teen mothers do not demand
large amounts of public assistance
resources. In fact, unmarried moth-
ers under age eighteen represent
only 1.2% of mothers currently
receiving AFDC.3 4 Second, these
policies do not reflect a realistic pic-
ture of mothering teens. Many fac-
tors commonly assumed to be con-
sequences of early pregnancy such
as educational difficulties, low self
esteem, poverty and unemployment
appear instead to be partial causes.
Recent studies suggest that most
young mothers leave school before
becoming pregnant rather than the
converse, and that mothers who give
birth while in school are just as like-
ly to graduate as their peers.35
A study by University of
Chicago economist Joe Hotz chal-
lenges conventional wisdom by
comparing mothering teens with
teens who miscarried and then had
their first live births years later.
36
Since these women would have been
teen mothers, but for an unintended
miscarriage, they are similar to teen
mothers in many significant ways.
Hotz concluded that, "over their
adult lives, teen mothers are no
more likely to participate in welfare
programs, or to suffer seriously
reduced earnings than if they had
postponed childbearing." 37 Other
findings of the same study suggest
that women who had their children
before age eighteen worked one
third more hours by their twenties
and thirties, had higher annual earn-
ings and received less in welfare
payments than the other women in
the study. Given this evidence, it is
hard to see how forcing young
women with children to live at home
will serve the goals of the act.
Additionally, the popular new
practice of cutting off teens who
refuse to live at home ignores the
reality faced by many of these
young women. Issues of abuse,
incest, neglect, or irreconcilable dif-
ferences may predispose them to not
live at home. Many were already not
living at home when they became
pregnant. Some young women left
home involuntarily. For example,
when Michigan enacted a live-at-
home policy in 1992 state welfare
agencies found that forty-six percent
of the parenting teens who lived
independently were thrown out by
their parents or guardians. 38 Thirty
seven percent of teens living outside
of their homes would be at high risk
for abuse, injury or neglect in the
homes of their parents. In fact,
Michigan child welfare workers
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already knew many teen mothers
because of previous interventions on
their behalf in cases of child abuse or
neglect.
Although the PRWORA provides
an exemption for cases of domestic
abuse, no mechanisms exist to ensure




with their parents or
face a funding cut-off




for exemption in every state. It
remains unclear exactly what types of
abuse qualify for the exemption or
how a young woman is to document
and prove such abuse. Even in cases
where a teen mother is able to receive
an exemption for abuse, the live-at-
home provision requires that she live
in a "second chance home" at state
expense. No funding mechanism cur-
rently exists to ensure that a state has
a sufficient number of beds to meet
the possible demand. The lack of
facilities, combined with the lack of
funding needed to create new homes,
could encourage states to downplay
parenting teen's allegations of abuse
or ignore requests for exemptions.
In Massachusetts, for example,
teen parent programs report that
some state workers give parenting
teen clients an ultimatum to either
return home or lose benefits. Often,
state workers do not inform teen
mothers in potentially abusive situa-
tions of their options for a "second
chance home."39 An in depth analy-
sis of these programs is and will most
likely remain difficult because states
are currently not required to evaluate
or even monitor the short or long-
term effects of programs like the
stay-at-home requirements.
In sum, the policies of the act
aimed at stopping teen pregnancy
ignore the needs of women who are
bearing children while in their teens
and do not represent a realistic or sig-
nificant way to reduce public expen-
diture. In fact, they may end up
increasing expenditures due to the
funding needs for second chance
homes. Additionally, the policies
may imperil minor age mothers and
their dependent children. Creating a
situation in which teen mothers must
live with their parents or face a fund-
ing cut-off may put them at risk of
either domestic violence or extreme
poverty.
B. FAMILY CAPS: CHILD
EXCLUSION
Under PRWORA, all states will
have the option of enacting another
policy that aims at altering maternal
behavior through the denial of bene-
fits to children. Under this provision,
often called the "family cap" provi-
sion or "family exclusion program," a
child born to a woman already
receiving AFDC or TANF benefits
will not be eligible for additional
benefits. This policy rests on two
faulty assumptions.
The first assumption is that
impoverished women bear more chil-
dren (and out-of-wedlock children)
than other women. In fact, mothers
on AFDC as a whole have a lower
birthrate than the population at
large.40 The second assumption is a
widespread belief that women bear
additional children to get more
money. However, a 1994
Washington study found, unsurpris-
ingly, that the more children a woman
has, the poorer she gets.41 Anyone
who has purchased diapers recently
realizes that it is irrational to think
that women bear children in order to
get wealthier. In addition, a separate
1994 study of the relationship
between benefit levels and reproduc-
tive choice-making found that benefit
levels have no significant effect on
the likelihood that white or black
women will have children outside of
marriage.42 Family caps also do not
square with data that show that most
pregnancies are unplanned. 43
Little empirical evidence supports
the contention that "family cap" poli-
cies significantly impact the teen-age
birthrate, out-of-wedlock birthrate or
public expenditure. New Jersey
began a family exclusion program in
October 1992. New Jersey's then-
Governor Jim Florio boasted that the
family cap policy had resulted in a
16% drop in births to women on
AFDC in the first one hundred days
of the program.44 The state has since
revised this claim to a drop of nine
percent.45 Even if this 1994 figure of
a nine percent decrease had fully con-
trolled for the national decline in
birthrates,4 6 this represents only .25
percent of New Jersey's total AFDC
caseload.47 Since definitive research
has not yet shown family caps to
have an impact on the out-of-wed-
lock birthrates, their only effect
seems to be punitive.
C. IMPOSED TIME LIMITS
UC DAVIS JOURNAL OF JUVENILE LAW AND POLICY SPRING 19971
II
Bill Clinton explained during the
1992 presidential campaign,
"[w]elfare should be a stepping
stone, not a way of life."48
Motivated by the erroneous assump-
tion that welfare recipients simply
lack incentive to work, PRWORA
imposes a cumulative five-year limit
for receiving benefits on TANF
recipients. Additionally, recipients
must begin working within two years
enrollment. The focus of this provi-
sion, with the use of cumulative time
as a measure of welfare dependence,
flies in the face of social science and
policy research that has extensively
explored the employment patterns of
the occasional or "short-term" AFDC
recipient.
Typically, poor women cycle in
and out of low wage and unstable
jobs. For example, in Kathleen
Mullen Harris's research on single
mothers, she found that, "more than
half (57%) of women who worked
their way off public assistance later
returned because their jobs ended or
they still could not make ends
meet."49 Another study of poor, non-
AFDC single mothers determined
that they "experience significant lev-
els of job instability, holding an aver-
age of 1.7 jobs during the two year
survey period." 50 The fungible
nature of poor women's work and the
absence of long-term job stability
make the cumulative time ban and
work requirement unreasonable.
Welfare becomes less of a stepping
stone or safety net and more of a one-
use parachute.
Time limits punish single parent
families who cycle on and off of wel-
fare or AFDC/TANF because of
structural constraints beyond their
immediate control. Unstable eco-
nomic conditions, high health and
child care expenses, lack of practical
education, and poor employment
opportunities are often reasons for
needing public assistance. These fac-
tors are unlikely to change with a
prescribed time limit or mandatory
work requirement.
States can choose to exempt up to
twenty percent of their recipients
from this cut-off. However, twenty
percent may not be enough. Parents
who are either disabled or care for a
disabled dependent already account
for more than twenty-five percent of
the average state caseload and alone
would exceed the allotted twenty per-
cent. This ceiling leaves no breathing
room for single parents who want to
work, but simply can not find
employment that provides them with
income sufficient to provide for the
child care, health care, housing and
nutritional needs of their families.
V. ORIGINAL SIN REVISITED:
BLAMING WOMEN
If funding cut-offs such as those
in the PRWORA fail to serve the
explicit purposes of welfare reform
of reducing the deficit, discouraging
out-of-wedlock births and helping
children, then it is important to con-
sider what interests these sanctions
actually serve.
First, the rhetoric used throughout
the bill continues to serve a long-
standing tradition of blaming women
for a variety of social ills. For exam-
ple, society has assigned women
responsibility for birth defects, infant
mortality, childhood schizophrenia,
autism, incest, homosexuality, stut-
tering, childhood behavior problems,
and juvenile delinquency. The ideas
codified in the welfare reforms add
widespread poverty and the break-
down of traditional values to this list.
Second, policies that penalize
women for being poor or unmarried
serve to normalize a specific and
inflexible idea of what a family is
and should look like. As Lisa Maher
points out, "within western cultures,
a much romanticized idealized notion
of the family has formed the basis of
a model for the regulation and con-
trol of women." 51 Women who are
not married, not white, not Christian,
or not heterosexual presumably are
inferior mothers. Being poor and not
living up to the American ideal of
individualism and self-reliance repre-
sent even further moral failings.
By establishing unreasonable
requirements, it becomes easier to
find recipients' socioeconomic status
their own fault. This absolves soci-
ety and fellow citizens of collective
responsibility for the well-being of
impoverished families.
Congresswoman Meyers of Kansas
articulates this point by stating that
the Teenage Pregnancy Reduction
Act, "ensures that the responsibility
for having a child belongs to the
mother and father, [rather] than the
mother and US taxpayers."'52 The
vision encoded in PRWORA of
impoverished mothers existing in iso-
lation, absent a larger social context,
speaks directly to this issue.
VI. CONCLUSION: MOVING
TOWARDS SOLUTIONS
Instead of blaming individuals,
welfare reformers need to refine their
modes of inquiry. The line of ques-
tioning that asks, "what is wrong
with these parents?" needs to be
replaced with, "why is the current
system failing these families?"
As a first step, lawmakers need to
abandon nineteenth century notions
about the role of social welfare.
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Social reformers during the so-called
progressive era did a great deal to
create innovative programs. They
galvanized public support for assis-
tance programs and organized and
assisted immigrants (something we
have abandoned in 1996). It is time,
however, to conceptualize the state
and it's policies as more than tempo-
rary and benevolent philanthropy.
Welfare programs should not be con-
sidered the work of "do-gooders"
pitching pennies at widows and
orphans.
Instead, integrated approaches
that consider how the modem
American family functions as a unit
made up of interdependent members
are essential. For example, assuming
that a functional adult with a dis-
abled child chooses not to work
ignores the structural constraints
under which that individual lives. In
order to work, that parent would
need quality care for her special
child. She would need access to
affordable medical care. She may
need education beyond training for a
minimum wage job in order to be
able to provide a safe environment
for herself and her child without
public assistance.
There needs to be public
acknowledgment that the decline in
manufacturing jobs, the expansion of
the poor-paying service economy,
the high cost of medical expenses,
education and child care and the dis-
crepancy between salaries earned by
men and salaries earned by women
has shifted the meaning of self-
reliance. Policies that emphasize the
filling of those gaps would be more
likely to alleviate poverty and
reliance on cash handouts than mis-
guided attempts to reinforce unreal-
istic notions of marraige and mother-
hood. As Barbara Katz Rothman
explains, "we must as a society take
shared economic responsibility for
the care of our children. Children
and their mothers must not be depen-
dent on the generosity of a high-
earning man." 53
There needs to be an expanding
conceptualization of ourselves as a
first world nation assuming responsi-
bility for all of its people, regardless
of age, race, gender, marital or immni-
gration status. By emphasizing mar-
riage as a solution to poverty, law-
makers seem to turn a blind eye to
the current demographic and eco-
nomic situation. These policies
expect women to place themselves in
marriages in order to alleviate the
state of responsibility. A real remedy
to the crisis of poverty would be a
welfare system that proposed treat-
ing people in need of assistance with
dignity and respect. True reform
would not penalize the poor, but
would have the stated intent of pro-
viding realistic access to resources
that would enable families to over-
come the barriers to transcending
poverty.
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